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State v. Huffstetler: Denying Mitigating Instructions in Capital
Cases on Grounds of Relevancy
To ensure that capital punishment is imposed fairly and with reasonable
consistency, North Carolina's capital punishment statute1 requires the sentenc-
ing jury to determine whether enumerated aggravating circumstances outweigh
any mitigating factors.2 The North Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly de-
clared that during the sentencing phase of a capital case any reasonable doubt
regarding the submission of a proposed jury instruction concerning mitigating
factors should be resolved in the defendant's favor.3 In State v. Huffstetler,
4
however, the supreme court indicated that the trial judge will be afforded discre-
tion in determining whether evidence is sufficient to instruct the jury on a pro-
posed mitigating factor. 5 This decision differs from the manner in which the
capital punishment statutes of other states have been interpreted.
6
David Earl Huffstetler had been having marital trouble. On the morning of
January 1, 1982, he visited his mother-in-law, Edna Powell, to find out where his
wife had been staying. 7 Before arriving at Mrs. Powell's trailer Huffstetler had
injected himself with a solution made from two dissolved Dilaudid pills (a highly
potent painkiller) and had ingested an unknown quantity of alcohol; he had en-
gaged in similar consumption the prior evening. 8 After an argument concerning
whether Mrs. Powell knew where Huffstetler's wife was staying, Huffstetler
grabbed a frying pan and began beating Mrs. Powell.9 Mrs. Powell's body was
found that evening; she had been beaten so violently and extensively about the
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). Based on its interpretation of Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C.
431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution preclude either ajudge or jury from exercising discretion in imposing the death penalty.
Id. at 439, 194 S.E.2d at 25. The court invalidated and severed the portions of the death penalty
statute that granted sentencing discretion to the jury, leaving the state with a mandatory punishment
of death for certain offenses. Id. at 444-45, 194 S.E.2d at 28. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976), the United States Supreme Court invalidated North Carolina's mandatory death
penalty statute. The statute was constitutionally defective for three reasons: (1) evolving standards
of decency were contrary to the mandatory death penalty, (2) mandatory punishment failed to re-
move effectively the element of arbitrary jury discretion, and (3) the statute failed to allow specific
consideration of the accused's character and record. Id. at 288-305 (plurality opinion). Following
Woodson the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the current capital punishment statue. See
Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, 1977 N.C. Sass. LAWS 407 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000
(1983)). The constitutionality of this statute was first upheld in State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 349-
54, 259 S.E.2d 510, 537-44 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980). For a fuller discussion of the
history of enactment of North Carolina's current statute, see State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 56-63,
257 S.E.2d 597, 606-10 (1979); Comment, Capital Punishment in North Carolina: The 1977 Death
Penalty Statute and the North Carolina Supreme Court, 59 N.C.L. REv. 911, 911-13 (1981).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983).
3. State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 27, 292 S.E.2d 203, 223, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
4. 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1877 (1985).
5. Id. at 116-17, 322 S.E.2d at 125-26.
6. See infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
7. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. at 99, 322 S.E.2d at 115-16.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 100, 322 S.E.2d at 116.
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head, neck, and shoulders that the metal frying pan had fractured. 10 After dis-
posing of the frying pan and his bloodstained clothing, Huffstetler went to visit a
friend, Alice Cantrell, with whom he stayed until his arrest two days later on
January 3rd.11
At the guilt determination phase of his trial, Huffstetler refused to testify or
to offer evidence. After he was convicted of first degree murder, but before he
was sentenced, Huffstetler admitted his guilt and was permitted to testify before
the jury.12 During the sentencing phase, he submitted the following instruction
among the proposed list of mitigating factors to be considered by the jury:
"'That during the sentencing phase, the defendant testified under oath and ad-
mitted his role in the victim's death. That this admission of wrongdoing reflects
a potential for rehabilitation.'"13 This instruction was refused by the trial
judge. 14 The jury sentenced Huffstetler to death.
15
On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Huffstetler had
failed to produce sufficient evidence to require submission of the requested in-
struction. The court noted that Huffstetler had testified only after he had been
convicted of first degree murder, that he originally had not wished to testify but
had been persuaded to do so by his family, and that his testimony had been self-
serving since he had testified as to his addiction to drugs and alcohol at the time
of the murder in an attempt to show evidence of his impaired condition as a
mitigating factor. Justice Exum strongly dissented because he felt the court
should not determine that certain evidence is nonmitigating as a matter of law.
It is the jury's function, Exum wrote, to weigh all evidence of mitigating
circumstances:
A jury could reasonably find that defendant's admission of his guilt
was a first step toward recognition of his wrongdoing and his ultimate
potential rehabilitation. . . . The question is not whether this Court
thinks the defendant's admission is or is not a mitigating circumstance.
The question is whether a jury could reasonably find it to be one.
16
Justice Exum's dissenting opinion relied heavily on the standards estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court concerning evidence of mitigating
circumstances in capital cases. The United States Supreme Court in Lockett v.
Ohio17 struck down Ohio's capital punishment statute because the statute
permitted the sentencing judge to consider only three enumerated mitigating
factors.18 Under the Ohio statute, other circumstances pertaining to the defend-
10. Id. at 98, 322 S.E.2d at 115. Fragments of the frying pan were found near the victim's
head. Id.
11. Id. at 100, 322 S.E.2d at 116.
12. Id. at 99, 322 S.E.2d at 115.
13. Id. at 116, 322 S.E.2d at 125.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 101, 322 S.E.2d at 116.
16. Id. at 122-23, 322 S.E.2d at 128-29 (Exum, J., dissenting).
17. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
18. Upon the finding of one of the specified aggravating circumstances, the Ohio statute re-
quired the trial judge to determine whether one of the following three mitigating factors existed:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
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ant's character, record, and offense could not be considered. The Court con-
cluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer
• . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."'19 Individual-
ized sentencing, the Court reasoned, is an essential element in the equitable im-
position of capital punishment. Without the sentencer's consideration of all
relevant mitigating circumstances, "guided discretion" 20 in the imposition of
the death penalty would fail. In a footnote, the Court emphasized that its deci-
sion would not limit "the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrele-
vant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense." 21
The standard established by the Supreme Court in Lockett was applied one
year later by the same Court in Green v. Georgia.22 In Green the Court held that
during the sentencing phase of a capital case the hearsay rule could not prevent
introduction of the testimony of a third party to whom a confession was made
by Green's codefendant. This confession absolved Green of any part in the mur-
der. Green, therefore, stands for the proposition that state rules of evidence can-
not bar proof of relevant mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase
of a capital case.
Although Lockett v. Ohio involved a statute that failed to permit considera-
tion of all relevant mitigating factors, the Supreme Court has extended the ra-
tionale of Lockett to a sentencing judge's exclusion, as a matter of law, of
relevant evidence. In Eddings v. Oklahoma 23 the sentencing judge believed that
he was precluded from considering the sixteen year-old defendant's troubled
youth because the defendant was capable of comprehending the difference be-
tween right and wrong. The Supreme Court found the sentencer's failure to
consider all relevant evidence reversible error: "[S]entencer[s] . . . may deter-
mine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency,
though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. at 607 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 292.04(B) (1975)). If the trial judge failed to find the
existence of one of these mitigating factors, the Ohio statute required that the death penalty be
imposed. Id.
19. Id. at 604.
20. The common denominator among the concurring opinions of the Supreme Court justices in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was a belief that juries should not have arbitrary discretion
in imposing capital punishment. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[The statutes before the
Court leave] to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants
committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned."); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
313 (White, J., concurring). In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976), the case
invalidating North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute, the United States Supreme Court
ruled: "North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the jury in
its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which
shall die." Id.
21. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12.
22. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
23. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration." 24
North Carolina's capital punishment statute conforms to the requirements
of Lockett by providing in its list of enumerated factors that the jury is to con-
sider: "[a]ny other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems
to have mitigating value."'25 The North Carolina statute, which to a large extent
follows the Model Penal Code, 26 was enacted prior to the Lockett decision.
Upon convicting a defendant for first degree murder,2 7 the trial court is
required under North Carolina's capital punishment statute to conduct a sepa-
rate sentencing proceeding before a jury to determine whether the death penalty
should be imposed.28 Except in extraordinary circumstances the sentencing
phase is to be tried before the same jury that sat during the guilt determination
phase. 29 During the sentencing proceeding both the State and the defendant are
permitted to present evidence and argument concerning the imposition of the
death penalty.30 The State must prove the existence of an aggravating factor
beyond a reasonable doubt;3 1 the defendant, however, need only prove the exist-
ence of a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.32 The jury then
determines whether any aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist.33 Fol-
lowing this determination the jury is to weigh all mitigating circumstances
against the aggravating factors. Should this balance fall in favor of the State, the
jury is required to impose capital punishment.3 4 Although the jury may con-
24. Id. at 114-15.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (1983).
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.66 (Tent. Draft No. 9 (1959)); see State v. Johnson (Johnson
I), 298 N.C. 47, 60-63, 257 S.E.2d 597, 608-10 (1979).
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981) (definition of first degree murder).
28. Id. § 15A-2000(a)(1) (1983). The trial judge is permitted to impose a life sentence only
when (1) the prosecution declares it has no evidence of an aggravating factor, (2) the evidence of all
aggravating factors is insufficient as a matter of law, or (3) the jury is unable to agree unanimously
upon sentencing within a reasonable time. Comment, Vague and Overlapping Guidelines A Study of
North Carolina's Capital Sentencing Statute, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 765, 773-74 (1980).
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1983).
30. Id. § lSA-2000(a)(4).
31. Id. § 15A-2000(c)(1).
32. State v. Johnson (Johnson 1), 298 N.C. 47, 76, 257 S.E.2d 597, 618 (1979). The court in
Johnson I also stated that the judge must provide a peremptory instruction when all of the evidence,
"if believed, tends to show that a particular mitigating circumstance does exist." Id. The trial judge
need not give a peremptory instruction when there is conflicting evidence. State v. Smith, 305 N.C.
691, 704-07, 292 S.E.2d 264, 272-74, cert denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). When the defendant fails to
offer any evidence as to the existence of a mitigating circumstance, the defendant is not entitled to an
instruction related to that circumstance. State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 277, 283 S.E.2d 761, 779
(1981), cerL denied, 103 S. Ct. 3552 (1983); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 356, 279 S.E.2d 788,
809 (1981) ("It is the responsibility of the defendant to go forward with evidence that tends to show
the existence of a given mitigating circumstance ... ").
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983). Although § 15A-2000(c) requires the jury to re-
turn in writing its determination of those aggravating circumstances that it finds beyond a reasonable
doubt, there is no similar requirement that mitigating circumstances be returned in writing. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has declined to interpret the statute as requiring that the mitigating
factors found be returned in writing. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 231-32, 283 S.E.2d 732, 750-51
(1981); cert denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983). In State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 78, 301
S.E.2d 335, 354, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983), the court stated that the proper instruction
pertaining to this balancing role of the jury is:
Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circum-
11251985]
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sider only the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute,35 no such
restriction exists with regard to mitigating factors.36 The North Carolina
Supreme Court has defined a mitigating factor as:
a fact or group of facts which do not constitute any justification or
excuse for killing or reduce it to a lesser degree of. . . murder, but
which may be considered as extenuating, or reducing the moral culpa-
stances found by you is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the
death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found
by you?
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1983) provides that only the following aggravating cir-
cumstances may be considered:
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony.
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person.
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider or
abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or at-
tempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnap-
ping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb.
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any gov-
ernmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, employee of the
Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former judge or justice, prose-
cutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or former witness against the
defendant, while engaged in the performance of his official duties or because of the exercise
of his duty.
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.
(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct
in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of
other crimes of violence against person or persons.
36. Section 15A-2000(f) provides that mitigating circumstances include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or con-
sented to the homicidal act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truthfully
on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony.
(9) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have miti-
gating value.
N.C GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (1983). Trial courts have been admonished by the North Carolina
Supreme Court not to deviate from the wording of both aggravating and mitigating factors, except
when instructing on additional mitigating factors. State v. Williams (Douglas), 308 N.C. 47, 77, 301
S.E.2d 335, 354, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
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bility of the killing, or making it less deserving of the extreme punish-
ment than other first degree murders.
37
North Carolina's capital punishment statute has been criticized for not
clearly defining "the proper scope and character of evidence to be received."
38
The North Carolina Supreme Court initially clarified the statute's ambiguity by
declaring that the rules of evidence are not altered during the sentencing
phase. 39 The court in later decisions retreated from this statement and granted
defendants broad rights in presenting evidence to the jury.4° Defendants facing
the death penalty also were granted broad rights in instructing the jury as to
proposed mitigating factors. The rationale for this broad interpretation of evi-
dentiary rules during the sentencing phase of a capital case is that the jury,
which is vested with the sole power under North Carolina law to determine
whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, should be presented
with and properly instructed on all evidence potentially affecting the decision to
impose death.4 1 In a recent line of cases, however, the court has applied a more
stringent standard that limits a defendant's right to present evidence and to sub-
mit proposed instructions to the jury.42
In State v. Cherry43 the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the stand-
ard for admissibility of evidence of mitigating factors. The court held that evi-
dence concerning the general nature of the death penalty was irrelevant to
sentencing; therefore, such evidence was properly excluded by the trial judge.
44
The court noted that the proffered evidence did not refer to the defendant's char-
acter or record, or to circumstances of the charged offense as required by Lock-
ett. Referring to the language of the statute that any evidence having "probative
value may be received," '45 the court declared that "[tihe language of this statute
does not alter the usual rules of evidence or impair the trial judge's power to rule
on the admissibility of evidence."'46 Although a state court would not be pre-
cluded from restricting the admission of irrelevant evidence during the sentenc-
ing phase, a restriction on the admissibility of evidence as broad as that
enunciated in Cherry was invalidated by the United States Supreme Court in
37. State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 104, 282 S.E.2d 439, 446-47 (1981).
38. Comment, supra note 28, at 775.
39. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
43. 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980).
44. Cherry sought to introduce the affidavit of a newspaper reporter that innocent people some-
times were executed, the affidavit of a convicted murderer who had been successfully rehabilitated,
and evidence that capital punishment lacked deterrent effect. Id. at 97, 257 S.E.2d at 559; see also
State v. Williams (Larry), 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243, cert denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (evidence
of plea bargaining agreement excluded); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981) (evi-
dence of plea bargaining agreement between State and codefendant was irrelevant and properly ex-
cluded as mitigating factor); cf State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983) (State's
request that jury impose death penalty as a deterrent was improper, but was not error because de-
fendant failed to object).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (1983).
46. Cherry, 298 N.C. at 98, 257 S.E.2d at 559.
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Green v. Georgia.47
In State v. Pinch4 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified the state-
ments made in Cherry concerning the admissibility of evidence. In a retreat
from the wording of Cherry, the court explained the extent to which normal
rules of admissibility were to be applied during the sentencing phase of capital
cases; the trial judge may, in his discretion, exclude "repetitive or unreliable
evidence or that lacking an adequate foundation." 49 Apparently the court never
intended that the state's rules of evidence (beyond those pertaining to relevancy)
be used to exclude mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase. The
court further solidified this position by emphatically declaring: "[C]ommon
sense, fundamental fairness and judicial economy dictate that any reasonable
doubt concerning the submission of a statutory or requested mitigating factor be
resolved in the defendant's favor to ensure the accomplishment of complete jus-
tice .... -50 Reversible error in the failure to present to the jury a mitigating
factor, however, would be found only when (1) the factor was one that the jury
might reasonably have found to have mitigating value, (2) sufficient evidence of
the existence of that factor had been offered, and (3) the exclusion of this evi-
dence had resulted in ascertainable prejudice.
51
In State v. Huffstetler the defendant was allowed to testify before the jury,
but his proposed instruction pertaining to his potential for rehabilitation as a
mitigating factor was rejected. Under North Carolina law, a proposed instruc-
tion on a mitigating factor must be submitted to the jury when that instruction is
supported by the evidence and relates to the defendant's character or prior rec-
ord, or to circumstances of the offense;52 "[the] legislature intended that all miti-
gating circumstances, both those expressly mentioned in the statute and others
which might be submitted under G.S. 15A-2000 (f)(9), be on an equal footing
before the jury."' 53 Whether the United States Supreme Court decision in Lock-
47. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
48. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
49. Id. at 19, 292 S.E.2d at 219. The court commented on relevancy again in State v. Silhan,
302 N.C. 223, 245, 275 S.E.2d 450, 468 (1981) ("Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency,
however slight, to prove a fact in issue.").
50. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 27, 292 S.E.2d at 223.
51. Id. at 27, 292 S.E.2d at 223-24.
52. State v. Johnson (Johnson I), 298 N.C. 47, 74, 257 S.E.2d 597, 617 (1979). Although John-
son I requires that any relevant circumstance must be submitted to the jury upon a defendant's
timely request, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that when a proper request is not made,
failure to submit the circumstance to the jury is not error. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 24-25,
301 S.E.2d 308, 322-23 (when proper request is not made, trial court may in its discretion list only
the enumerated mitigating circumstances),cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983); State v. Goodman, 298
N.C. 1, 34, 257 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1979) ("ITihe court is not required to sift through the evidence and
search out every possible circumstance which the jury might find to have mitigating value."). Even
when a proper request is made, however, a mitigating circumstance need not be submitted to the jury
if the existence of this circumstance would be contrary to a conclusion made during the guilt deter-
mination phase. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (because defendant was convicted of
murder and breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, requested instruction during sen-
tencing concerning intoxication would be contrary to previous determination that defendant had the
specific intent to commit larceny), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983). In State v. Huffstetler defend-
ant had made a proper request to instruct the jury as to the mitigating factors requested for submis-
sion. Huffstetier, 312 N.C. at 121, 322 S.E.2d at 128 (Exum, J., dissenting).
53. Johnson I, 298 N.C. at 74, 257 S.E.2d at 617.
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ett mandates that the jury be instructed on all mitigating factors pertaining to the
defendant's character, record, and offense has not yet been resolved. Currently,
the federal courts of appeals are in conflict on this issue. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that failure to instruct the jury
as to a mitigating factor may constitute error under state law, but a constitu-
tional violation occurs only if the defendant is prevented from presenting miti-
gating evidence.5 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held that state courts are constitutionally required to give clear instructions on
mitigating factors in capital cases.
55
Two cases, State v. Brown56 and State v. Stokes, 57 exemplify the approach
taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court in determining whether the defend-
ant has presented evidence sufficient to support a jury instruction on the pro-
posed mitigating factor. In Brown defendant requested that his failure to act in a
calculated manner in killing his victim be submitted to the jury as a mitigating
factor. During the guilt determination phase the state had presented evidence
that defendant carried the murder weapon (a knife) from his home to the mur-
der scene,58 which tended to discredit defendant's assertion that he had not ac-
ted in a calculated manner. Although defendant presented virtually no evidence
pertaining to the requested instruction, the court rested its decision on the
grounds that it would be beyond reason to speculate that defendant acted with
premeditation, but had not acted in a calculated manner.59 Defendant had no
right to receive an instruction on a mitigating factor that, if believed, would
require the jury to engage in unreasonable, fanciful speculation.
The requested instruction considered by the court in Stokes was supported
only by minimal evidence, but a finding in the defendant's favor by the jury
would not have required an exercise in unreasonable speculation. Although
Stokes had been adjudged competent to stand trial, he presented evidence show-
ing he had been treated at the age of ten at a mental health center where he was
diagnosed as having "unsocialized aggressive behavior." 6 The defense also sub-
mitted evidence that Stokes had an IQ of 63. Although the weight of the evi-
dence was questionable given the length of time between his treatment at age ten
and the date of the homicide, the court held that the jury would not have been
acting without reason if it had found that the defendant was under the influence
54. Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1436-37 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 750
(1984); see also Barfield v. Harris, 540 F. Supp. 451, 472 (E.D.N.C. 1982) ("There was no constitu-
tional violation because the jury was not precluded from considering non-statutory mitigating fac-
tors."), aff'd., 719 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2401 (1984).
55. Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Chenault v.
Stynchcombe, 581 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1496 (1lth
Cir. 1983) ("We interpret Lockett v. Ohio and Gregg v. Georgia as vehicles for extending a capital
defendant's right to present evidence in mitigation to the placing of an affirmative duty on the state
to provide the funds necessary for production of. . . evidence."). The court in Westbrook, however,
held that the defendant's trial had not been fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1497.
56. 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080 (1982).
57. 308 N.C. 634, 304 S.E.2d 184 (1983).
58. Brown, 306 N.C. at 178-79, 293 S.E.2d at 587.
59. Id. at 178, 293 S.E.2d at 586.
60. Stokes, 308 N.C. at 654, 304 S.E.2d at 196.
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of an emotional disturbance at the time he committed the homicide. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the trial court because it had failed
to present the proposed instruction to the jury. In both Stokes and Brown the
court did not undertake to weigh the evidence before it, but rather concentrated
on what a jury reasonably could have found.
In three other recent North Carolina cases, the court weighed the credibil-
ity of the proposed evidence instead of determining whether such evidence had
probative value. The court in these cases established a minimum (though un-
stated) requirement for the sufficiency of evidence necessary for the defendant to
receive a requested instruction on a mitigating factor.
In State v. Moose61 the North Carolina Supreme Court held, on facts very
similar to those in State v. Stokes-defendant presented minimal evidence con-
cerning psychiatric disorders-that defendant was properly denied an instruc-
tion concerning emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor. The defense in
Moose presented testimony of a forensic psychiatrist who classified defendant as
having "'a mixed personality disorder' which was manifested by his inability to
deal adequately with frustrations which led to outbursts of temper." 62 Defend-
ant also was shown to have a history of repeated alcohol abuse. Despite the
expert testimony concerning defendant's emotional disorders, the court held
that the evidence weighed in favor of the State's theory that the defendant
merely had "a penchant for alcohol" and a bad temper: "[the defendant's] evi-
dence falls short of that necessary to support the submission of G.S. § 15A-
2000(f)(2), that the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance when he murdered [the deceased]." '63 The trial judge, according to
Justice Meyer's majority opinion, correctly instructed the jury on intoxication as
a mitigating circumstance; defendant, however, had failed to come forward with
the necessary quantum of evidence concerning an emotional disturbance at the
time of the homicide, so a jury instruction on this mitigating factor was properly
refused.
In State v. Craig64 defendants requested that the trial court submit as a
mitigating factor their willingness to undergo a polygraph examination. The
supreme court, affirming the decision not to submit the requested mitigating
factor, responded that defendants' willingness to take a polygraph examination
was wholly self-serving and, therefore, was not a relevant factor to be submitted
to the jury. Supporting its view of the evidence, the court explained that the
State, during the course of its investigation, never asked defendants to take a
polygraph examination. Defendants' evidence, therefore, did not show a willing-
ness to cooperate with the police. Justice Exum dissented, stating that a defend-
ant's offer to take a polygraph examination during the investigatory stages of a
criminal case is a "circumstance relating to. . . character which the jury might
61. 310 N.C. 482, 313 S.E.2d 507 (1984).
62. Id. at 498-99, 313 S.E.2d 518.
63. Id. at 499, 313 S.E.2d at 518.
64. 308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740, cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 263 (1983).
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reasonably deem to have mitigating value." 65 Justice Exum noted that a poly-
graph examination might have assisted the investigation of the homicide.
In State v. Boyd 66 the court again embarked on a path of weighing the
evidence before it. The trial court excluded the testimony of one of defendant's
witnesses, Dr. Jack Humphrey, a criminologist and university professor who
would have testified concerning his scientific study of inmates. Dr. Humphrey's
study tended to show that the act of killing a family member or loved one is
essentially an act of self-destruction. 67 The defendant sought to use this testi-
mony to draw together all other mitigating evidence into a unified theory--" 'a
unified whole which explained the apparent contradiction of killing the person
the defendant loved most.' 68 The court, rejecting the relevancy of Dr.
Humphrey's testimony, began by attacking the report as lacking comprehensive-
ness and having "questionable" scientific value as a mitigating circumstance.
69
The court balanced the defendant's claim concerning the reliability of the pro-
posed evidence against the contrary assertions of the State: "[The defendant's
evidence] would not, we believe, have added credibility to any of the individual
mitigating factors which were supported by the evidence and considered by the
jury."'70 Justice Exum rejoined with a sharp criticism of the decision: "That an
expert's opinions may be 'questionable' has never been a ground for excluding
them from evidence. It goes to the weight not the admissibility of expert
testimony."'7 1
Unlike the approach taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court in these
three cases, the state supreme courts of Georgia, Florida, and-to a lesser ex-
tent-Texas have interpreted their respective capital punishment statutes as cre-
ating a permissive standard of admissibility when considering mitigating
evidence. This permissive standard is based on the premise that the potential
harm resulting from restricting the information which the jury may consider
outweighs the harm that may result from repetitive and time consuming presen-
tation of evidence. If the defendant's evidence is of marginal probative value,
the greatest harm that could occur from the presentation of that evidence would
be that the jury would decline to give such evidence any weight, and that the
time required for its introduction would be wasted. The harm that could occur
from the exclusion of the marginally probative evidence would be of greater con-
sequence. When the jury is balancing aggravating circumstances against miti-
gating factors, even evidence considered by a trial judge to be of marginal
probative value has the potential to tip the scales of this balancing process on
behalf of the defendant and to lead the jury to conclude that the death penalty is
not appropriate for this defendant when all the evidence is considered.
65. Id. at 469, 302 S.E.2d at 754 (Exum, J., dissenting).
66. 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2052 (1985).
67. Id. at 414-15, 319 S.E.2d at 195.
68. Id. at 419, 319 S.E.2d at 197.
69. Id. at 421, 319 S.E.2d at 198-99.
70. Id. at 422, 319 S.E.2d at 199 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 437, 319 S.E.2d at 208 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted its statute72 as requiring a
much broader degree of admissibility than that imposed by Lockett. Chief Jus-
tice Burger praised the broad rules of admissibility created by the Georgia stat-
ute in Gregg v. Georgia 73
We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose un-
necessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered. . . . So
long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made. . . do not
prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We
think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as
possible when it makes the sentencing decision.74
In two cases75 the Georgia Supreme Court has allowed relatives of the de-
fendant to testify concerning their love for the defendant and their wish not to
see the defendant executed: "We are unwilling to foreclose a defendant seeking
to avoid the imposition of the death penalty from appealing to the mercy of the
jury by having his parents testify briefly to their love for him. '76 This broad
interpretation of the Georgia statute is clearly reflected in Brooks v. State :77
This court is of the opinion that evidence as to mitigation should not
necessarily be confined to the strict rules of evidence. The trial court
should exercise a broad discretion in allowing any evidence reasonably
tending toward mitigation.
78
The only restriction placed on this broad definition of relevancy by the Georgia
Supreme Court is that the proposed evidence must pertain to the particular de-
fendant, rather than to the death penalty in general. Such evidence as descrip-
tions of executions and testimony concerning religious theology has been ruled
inadmissible because it lacks relevancy.
79
The Florida Supreme Court also has interpreted its statute80 liberally in
determining the admissibility and relevancy of evidence during the sentencing
phase of a capital case:
In the penalty proceedings certain types of evidence which may be
inadmissible in a trial on guilt may be admissible and relevant to en-
able the jury to make an informed recommendation based on the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances concerning the acts
committed. . . . There should not be a narrow application or inter-
pretation of the rules of evidence in the penalty hearing, whether in
regard to relevance or to any other matter except illegally seized
evidence. 8'
72. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1981).
73. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
74. Id. at 203-04.
75. Romine v. State, 251 Ga. 208, 305 S.E.2d 93 (1983); Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d
530 (1981).
76. Cofield, 247 Ga. at 112, 274 S.E.2d at 542.
77. 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 961 (1980).
78. Id. at 584, 261 S.E.2d at 387.
79. See Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
81. Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 538-39 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976). The
trial judge may consider information that neither the State nor the defendant attempted to introduce
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Due to the broad rules of admissibility under Florida law, there is a paucity of
cases in which evidence of a mitigating factor has been excluded by the trial
court as inadmissible.82 This sparsity of cases suggests that, with regard to ques-
tions of relevancy, the Florida trial bench tends to err in favor of the defendant.
Although the Florida Supreme Court frequently is confronted with defendants
arguing to have the existence of a mitigating factor determined as a matter of
law, 83 cases in which the court must decide whether proffered evidence was im-
properly rejected as irrelevant are rare. The court has had occasion to rule that
the trial court's exclusion of the record of a plea bargaining agreement between
the State and the defendant's accomplice was reversible error.84 The court also
has found reversible error when a psychiatrist's evaluation of the defendant was
rejected as irrelevant.
85
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted Texas' capital pun-
ishment statute86 as allowing the trial judge broad discretion in determining the
relevancy and admissibility of evidence during the sentencing phase. This inter-
pretation of the statute is based upon its wording: "In the proceeding, evidence
may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence."
' 87
By including this provision in the Texas statute, the legislature "intended for
sentencing evidence in a capital murder case to be as complete as possible." 88
The Texas statute, therefore, should be interpreted as allowing the trial judge
broad discretion in admitting evidence but requiring greater restraint in the ex-
clusion of evidence. 89 Generally, the Texas trial courts have excluded mitigating
evidence offered by a defendant only when such evidence pertained to the de-
fendant's early family history.90
The North Carolina Supreme Court should follow the precedent set by
Georgia, Florida, and Texas and apply a nonrestrictive definition of relevancy
as relevant to sentencing. See Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1975), cert denied, 428 U.S. 911
(1976).
82. Cf. Boyd & Logue, Developments in the Application of Florida's Capital Felony Sentencing
Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 441, 463 (1980) ("court's approach to what is relevant should be broad
rather than narrow").
83. See, eg., Daugherty v. State, 419 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228
(1983); Riley v. State, 413 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1983); Smith v. State,
407 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982); Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla.
1979).
84. Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976).
85. Simmons v. State, 419 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1982).
86. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
87. Id. art 37.071(a).
88. Crump, Capital Murder The Issues in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 531, 565 (1977).
89. Cases in which the trial judge has exercised this broad discretion in favor of admitting
evidence on behalf of the State abound. See, eg., Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981); McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979); Rumbaugh v. State, 589 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d
699 (rex. Crim. App. 1979), cert withdrawn, 448 U.S. 725 (1980). This broad discretion has been
used to limit the defendant's evidence in a few cases. For a case in which such discretion has been
erroneously used to exclude the defendant's evidence, see Robinson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977) (error for trial court to exercise discretion to exclude testimony of psychologist on
behalf of defendant).
90. Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Penalty Statutes Constitutional Infirmities Related
to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1343, 1400-01 (1977).
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when examining the mitigating evidence offered by the defendant in a capital
case. The wording of North Carolina's capital punishment statute indicates that
the legislature intended for the courts to apply a liberal standard when determin-
ing whether evidence offered by a defendant should be excluded or a supportive
jury instruction denied. The statute provides that "[a]ny evidence which the
court deems to have probative value may be received." 9 1 The trial judge is re-
quired to instruct the jury that it must consider any mitigating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence.92 Among the list of enumerated miti-
gating factors, the jury is told that it is to consider any other circumstances that
would weigh against the death penalty.93 Further, the legislature has specifi-
cally provided that a liberal standard be applied in noncapital cases.
94
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the well-reasoned decision of State
v. Pinch,9 5 indicated that any reasonable doubt concerning the submission of a
mitigating instruction to the jury should be resolved in the defendant's favor. In
a recent line of cases, however, the court has abandoned the reasoning of Pinch
in favor of stricter rules of relevancy. The court should reestablish its prior
position that any instruction not requiring the jury to engage in unreasonable
speculation must be submitted upon a proper request by the defendant.
When the jury is left without standards in imposing the death penalty, such
punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. 96 Death is a unique punishment requiring the most exacting pre-
cautions against its arbitrary imposition. Failure to allow the jury in a capital
case to examine all available information and to determine the weight to be
given this evidence risks imposing the death penalty without appropriate stan-
dards. Similarly, when the jury is not properly instructed on the evidence of-
fered by the defendant to mitigate the offense, an element of arbitrariness is
infused into the jury's determination. The very purpose of requiring the jury to
consider mitigating factors is to give "the sentencer all the information which
might be necessary to determine whether the defendant should be singled out for
this extremely rare penalty." 97 This purpose is defeated when the information
the jury is to receive is limited.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Huffstetler9 s indi-
cates that it is permissible for trial courts to weigh the evidence in determining
whether a proposed instruction in a capital case is supported by the defendant's
evidence. The weighing of evidence, however, is a function that North Caro-
ina's capital punishment statute reserves exclusively for the jury. In a capital
case the defendant's life hangs in the balance; the court should admit all evi-
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (1983).
92. Id. § 15A-2000(b).
93. Id. § 15A-2000(f)(9). This subsection of the statute is particularly significant in that the
legislature required the jury to consider all possible mitigating evidence before such a requirement
was constitutionally imposed.
94. Id. § 15A-1334(b) ("Formal rules of evidence do not apply at the [sentencing] hearing.").
95. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
96. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
97. Kaplan, Evidence in Capital Cases, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. RPV. 369, 372 (1983).
98. 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1877 (1985).
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dence from which the jury could reasonably find that the defendant's moral
culpability has been reduced, even if the evidence has minimal probative value.
To prevent confusion of the issues, however, the court should only admit evi-
dence pertaining specifically to the defendant; the court should exclude evidence
pertaining to the death penalty in general. Any other restriction, under the guise
of relevancy, prevents the jury from making a fair and fully informed decision as
it determines which defendants are to live and which are to die.
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